The Political Economy of Fiscal Rules: adoption, compliance, and enforcement
My research is centred around fiscal rules and the interaction with financial markets and specifically looks at the adoption, compliance, and enforcement of fiscal rules. To bridge the gap between theoretical discussions and the effectiveness of real-world arrangements, I have put together a novel data set on fiscal rule compliance at the national and supranational level. This dataset is then used to investigate how regime type impacts fiscal rule adoption, if sovereign debt ownership composition impacts fiscal compliance, when financial markets function as fiscal rule enforcers.
Existing research on fiscal rule adoption and compliance, which is related to enforceability, covers sub-national rules, restricts the analysis to certain types of fiscal rule, or focuses on certain regions. One study looks at fiscal compliance across countries. Moreover, none consider the timing of rule adoption for enforceability, distinguish enforceability between democracies and non-democracies, use primary country-level data to investigate compliance, or consider the impact of a home bias in government bond ownership. My research fills this gap and thus aims to provide a better understanding about the limits to enforceability through different mechanisms and in different contexts. It feeds the broader debate about institutional responses to the great recession and test assumptions upon which existing market stabilizing institutions rest.